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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JULIAN BARLOW, CHARLES
CLEGG, and DIXIE CLEGG,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,

Case No. 15609

vs.
CHARLES KEENER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action by a landlord to evict his tenant
and to collect back rent and other damages incident to
cleaning and restoring the premises, together with costs
and the statutory penalty of treble damages.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Upon defendant's failure personally to appear at
settlement conference as ordered by the court, judgment was
entered for the plaintiffs for the sum of the rent due and
-1-
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court costs.

The motion of defendant's attorney for relief

from judgment pursuant to Rules 59 and 60 was denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek dismissal of this appeal or in
the alternative an affirmance of the judgment below.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff Julian Barlow is the owner of improved
real estate located at 758 Browning Avenue, Salt Lake City,
Utah.

Plaintiffs Charles Clegg and Dixie Clegg are the

agents of Mr. Barlow for purposes of leasing said property.

On or about December 1, 1975, plaintiffs leased the
premises to the defendant, Charles Keener, on a month-tomonth basis for an agreed rental of $85.00 per month to
be paid in advance, along with an initial $25.00 cleaning
deposit.
The defendant and his family resided in the
premises from December 1, 1975 until at least January 14,
1976 when the complaint was filed in this action, but
refused to pay the cleaning deposit and the rentals due in
December, 1975 and in January, 1976.

Plaintiffs duly

noticed defendant on January 5, 1976 to pay the rent or to
surrender the premises which defendant failed and refused
to do.

The plaintiffs then filed the complaint in this
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action (Record, pp. 2, 3).
Defendant filed an answer dated January 22, 1976
prepared by his attorney Richard T. Black (Record, p. 5).
On or before August 23, 1977 Jonathan H. King assumed the

defense of the action and on said date moved to be allowed
to amend the answer because "the above-entitled matter
cannot be adequately defended in the absence of amending
the answer."

In the alternative, Mr. King moved to be

allowed to withdraw as counsel should permission to amend
be disallowed, again because "the above-entitled matter
cannot be adequately defended by counsel unless leave to
file an amended answer is granted."

(Record, p. 16).

Leave to amend was granted and the defendant's
attorney added, among other things, the fourth defense
appearing in the amended answer (Record, pp. 14, 15).
On November 8, 1977 Judge Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. ordered

that the parties and their counsel appear at a pretrial
settlement conference to be held November 21, 1977
(Record, p. 20).

The defendant failed to personally appear

on that date and his counsel admitted that his client had
not maintained contact with him and that there was no
prospect that the defendant would appear for trial (Record,
p. 23).
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Plaintiff moved for judgment against defendant
which was granted by the court for two month's rent and
for costs of $32.60 (Record, pp. 23, 24).

Defendant's

attorney subsequently moved for relief from judgment which
was denied by Judge David B. Dee on December 30, 1977
(Record, p. 28) .
Defendant's attorney then prosecuted this appeal
primarily to determine the narrow issues raised by the

fourt~

defense of his amended complaint: whether a warranty of habit·
ability is implied in a leasehold and if so, whether the same
excuses defendant from paying rent.
POINT I
THIS APPEAL IS MOOT AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED WHERE THERE IS
NO BASIS IN lITAH LAW THAT AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
IS A DEFENSE TO NON-PAYMENT OF RENT
In McRae v. Jackson,

Utah 2d __ , 526 P.2d 1190,

(1974), minors sued by their guardians to be allowed to obcai:
drivers licenses.

The trial court held for the minors.

Defendant appealed, but in the interim the plaintiffs obtainec
their licenses.

This court, in holding the case to be moot

and in dismissing the appeal, said:
Although no Utah case precisely in point
has been found, the general principle, to
which we adhere, is stated in 5 Am.Jur. 2d,
Appeal and Error, §761: "The function of
appellate courts like that of courts generallv,
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is not to give opinions on merely abstract
or theoretical matters, but only to decide
actual controversies injuriously affecting
the rights of some party to the litigation,
and it has been held that questions or cases
which have become moot or academic are not
a proper subject to review." .Id. at 1191.
As will be seen below, there is absolutely no
controversy remaining in this appeal prosecuted by the
attorney for defendant.

The defendant long ago abandoned

the defense of the case and his counsel has had no contact
with him for more than a year.

Furthermore, there is

absolutely no basis in the law of Utah or the facts of this
case to protract these matters further.

Two judges below

have already passed upon the question of warranty and found
it totally without merit.
Here, there is no actual controversy between
the litigants at this time. The plaintiffs
have no practical interest in any disposition
that could now be made by this court. This
appeal presents simply an abstract question
of law which does not rest upon existing facts
or rights. Therefore, this court must, in
the exercise of its discretion, dismiss the
appeal on the simple ground that the case has
become moot and is not of sufficient public
interest, regardless of whether the trial court
erred or not. .19.. at 1192
The court in McRae restricted "public interest"
issues to those involving "extraordinary circumstances"
coupled with a class action, a constitutional interpretation question, the validity or construction of a statute
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and the propriety of administrative rulings.

This case

deals with patently ordinary circumstances and does not
involve any of those questions.
Appellant's brief is almost totally devoted to
arguing that a warranty of habitability should be part of
a lease and that a breach of that warranty should be a
defense to non-payment of rent by the tenant.

The authori-

ties cited by appellant's attorney, however, are not the
law of Utah.

This court has not authorized such a warrant·1

or defense, nor has the legislature of this state.

The

Appellant recognizes at page 4 of his brief that the cormnon
law does not imply a warranty of habitability.

By statutor·:

mandate, the courts of Utah are to apply the common law:
The common law of England so far as it is
not repugnant to, or in conflict with, the
constitution or laws of the United States,
or the constitution or laws of this state,
and so far only as it is consistent with and
adopted to the natural and physical conditions
of this state and the necessities of the
people hereof, is hereby adopted, and shall be
the rule of decision in all the courts of this
state. 68-3-1, U.C.A.
At least one case decided by this court has
implied that the common law rule not recognizing a warrant::
of habitability is perfectly consistent with the physical
conditions of the state and necessities of the people.
In Lincoln Financial Corp. v. Ferrier,
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L'tah

567 P.2d 1102, (1977), a lessor sued to evict a monthto-month lessee after she was duly served with notice.

The

tenant resisted by claiming the landlord was only evicting
her for retaliatory purposes because she had attempted
"to obtain better conditions for herself and other tenants."
This court, however, decided the case on the basis of the
rights guaranteed to property holders by the Utah Constitution:
We are also concerned with the constitutional
rights of the landlord. Our Utah Constitution,
Article 1, Section 1 states: "All men have
the inherent and inalienable right . . . to
II
acquire, possess, and protect property . .
. . . The question that must be confronted
and answered is: If the landlord cannot
enforce the terms of his lease and proceed
under the express provisions of our statutory
law to reclaim his property, what has happened
to his property rights? Id. at 1104, 1105
This court affirmed an award of treble damages to
the landlord.

By implication, a recognition of an implied

warranty of habitability would deprive a landlord of his
property rights since he could not evict a tenant who
asserted that defense even if duly noticed.
Another Utah case has rejected the attendant
proposition posed by defendant's attorney that covenants in
a leasehold are mutually dependent.

In King v. Firm,

3 Utah 2d 419, 285 P.2d 1114, (1955) a tenant claimed to

-7-
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be able to offset a debt owed to him by his landlord against
the rent.

In rejecting that argument, the court cited with

approval the following passage from Williston on Contracts:
rent is due under a lease, the
tenant must pay the rent even though he has
been obligated to spend money on repairs
which the landlord covenanted to make . . .
it cannot be said that the tenant has paid
or tendered the rent due if he had deducted
even a valid cross-claim.
Id. at 1117
~'**Where

The clear implication of this language is that a tenant

may

not unilaterally decide to decrease his rent in order to
improve the premises or because of some other claim between
the parties.
Thus, as a matter of law, plaintiffs are entitled
to judgment in this case.

The only possible dispute--the

condition of the premises--is irrelevant given the law of
Utah which does not recognize the implied warranty of
habitability as a defense to an action for rent.

Defendant

has not contested the fact that the rent is due and owing
and in numerous places in his pleadings and brief has
recognized that his case is indefensible without the implied
warranty of habitability.

The default judgment entered

below should thus be affirmed or this appeal dismissed where
no question remains to be resolved.

The appeal is moot.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETIO~ AND JUDGMENT
FOR PLAINTIFFS WAS PROPERLY ENTERED WHERE DEFENDANT HAS
FAILED TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH HIS COUNSEL AND HAS
ABANDONED HIS DEFENSE

Defendant's counsel has admitted to having no
contact with his client since at least May, 1977
(Appellant's brief, p. 2), and that no prospect exists that
defendant would personally appear at trial.

As a result

of his willful absence, the defendant has failed to obey
the trial court's order to appear for settlement conference.
The defendant was warned by that order that sanctions for
non-appearance were a distinct possibility:
IF COUNSEL FAIL TO APPEAR OR IF SETTLEMENT
EFFORTS ARE THWARTED BY THE NON-APPEARANCE
OF A PARTY, ATTORNEYS FEES MAY BE ALLOWED
TO OPPOSING PARTIES AND THE COURT MAY IMPOSE
OTHER SANCTIONS AS MAY SEE[M] JUST IN THE
CASE.

Defendant's non-appearance, in the trial court's
discretion, thwarted settlement efforts and the judgment
was granted for plaintiff for the rents due and owing.
Not only did defendant thwart settlement by
disobeying a court order, but his failure to keep in contact
with his attorney is further willful misconduct justifying the
judgment entered.

Without knowing the location of defendant,

plaintiffs will be prejudiced in their efforts both in
discoverv and at trial.

It is now impossible that any
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discovery be had directly from the defendant.

Likewise,

defendant could not be called as an adverse witness by
plaintiffs.

Such discovery or testimony could be

crucial to plaintiff's case.

Rule 37(b)(2)(C) authorizes

various sanctions against disobedient parties i.ncl11ding
judgment by default; defendant's disappearance and
consequent disobedience t:i the settlement order is analogous
to the situation under that rule.
Speaking of a client's failure to maintain contact
with his attorney, a recent case said:
A defendant is under a duty to keep in touch
with his attorney so that he can answer
interrogatories or take any other action his
attorney might find necessary pending litigation ... His failure to maintain such contact
amounts to "conscious indifference to consequence," which our courts equate with "willful
misconduct." Sta-Power Industries, Inc. v.
Avant, 134 Ga.App. 952, 216 S.E. 2d 897,
902, 1975.
That court entered default judgment where the
party failed to comply with discovery requests due to loss
of contact with his attorney.

By analogy, where defendant

has failed to obey a court order requiring his appearance
at settlement conference and where his abandonment of his
defense may prejudice future discovery efforts by plaintiffs,
then the trial court did not abuse its discretion in enterb
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judgment for plaintiffs.
In Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 Utah 416, 260
P.2d 741, (1953) the court affirmed a judgment by default
and corranented on the propriety of reversing the same
as follows:
The allowance of a vacation of judgment is a
creature of equity designed to relieve against
harshness of enforcing a judgment, which may
occur through procedural difficulties, the
wrongs of the opposing party, or misfortunes
which prevent the presentation of a claim
or defense. Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure outlines the situations
wherein a party may be relieved from a final
judgment . . . Equity considers factors which
may be irrelevant in actions at law, such as
the unfairness of a party's conduct, his
delay in bringing or continuing the action,
the hardship in granting or denying relief.
Although an equity court no longer has complete
discretion in granting or denying relief it
may exercise wide judicial discretion in
weighing the factors of fairness and public
convenience, and this court on appeal will reverse
the trial court only where an abuse of this discretion is clearly shown. ~· at 742.
In the case now before the court, two judges have
approved the entry of default judgment against the defendant.
Defendant has personally abandoned his defense, and while
plaintiffs have no direct evidence to the effect that
defendant's attorney is merely proceeding with this case as a
substitute for legislative action, the primary inference to
be drawn from the unwarranted protraction of this simple
-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

action by a landlord for two months rent could be no other.
The lower courts have twice held, in essence, that in
fairness to the plaintiffs and in the interest of public
convenience, that is, relieving the schedules of the courts
of this state from further consideration of a case so
patently without merit, that default judgment was a proper
remedy.
The rule that the courts will incline towards
granting relief to a party who has not had
opportunity to present his case is ordinarily
applied at the trial court level, and this
court will not reverse the trial court where
it appears . . . that all elements were
considered, merely because the motion could
have been granted. Warren, at 744.
The law of Utah does not recognize the defense
advanced by defendant's attorney and the defendant has
himself abandoned all contact with his attorney.

In the

words of the court in Chrysler v. Chrvsler, 5 Utah 2d 415,
303 P. 2d 995, (1956):

Manifestly the court should not follow the
rule of indulgence toward the party in default
when the effect would be to work an injustice
or inequity upon the opposing party. A prime
requisite precedent to the granting of such
relief is that the movant demonstrate that he
comes to the court with clean hands and in good
faith. l3.· at 996, 997
In this case the defendant has engaged in "willL:
misconduct" by abandoning his defense and further proceedin:'
-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in this case would only work additional injustice and
inequity upon the plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's willful misconduct in not staying
in contact with his attorney, his consequent disobedience
to an order to appear for pretrial settlement, and the
implicit admission in defendant's brief that the rent
is owing coupled with the law of Utah which recognizes
no implied warranty of habitability as a defense to an
action for rent compel the conclusion that this appeal
is moot and should be dismissed or in the alternative that
the discretion of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

CHRISTENSEN,GARDINER,JENSEN & EVANS

(}m-(((2~
Jay E. Jensen•/wScott R. Jenkins
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